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A Two-Tiered Theory of Consolidation
and Separation of Powers
David Yassky
Not only did the New Deal expand the permissible areas of governmental activity, it also transformed the structure of the Federal Government. President Roosevelt's innovations centralized within large bureaucracies power that previously had been dispersed among the three
governmental branches. This consolidation of power fits uneasily into the
constitutional framework established by the Founders.
This Note explores the jurisprudential implications of the New Deal
watershed and elaborates a post-New Deal theory of allocation of governmental power. Part I begins with a discussion of the Federalist theory of
separation of powers. l For the Federalists, two conditions ensured an effective separation. First, governmental branches must be institutionally independent; each must be free from control by the others. Second, the
branches must be functionally specialized; each must wield a distinct component of governmental power, so that the assent of all three is required
for government action.
Until the New Deal, the Supreme Court incorporated this theory into
its jurisprudence through the nondelegation doctrine, which limited the
discretionary authority of administrative agencies. The Court displaced
this limitation in the late 1930's and early 1940's with a series of decisions
approving massive delegations of authority to the executive branch.
Contemporary separation of powers analysts dispute the meaning of the
Court's repudiation of the nondelegation doctrine. Separation of powers
"purists" insist on maintaining strict boundaries among the legislative, executive, and judicial functions, while "partialists" emphasize the balance
of power among institutionally independent branches.
Part II presents an alternative, two-tiered theory. According to this theory, the non delegation doctrine's demise was accompanied by the birth of
a "consolidation principle" requiring concentration of the government's
operational power within administrative agencies. Such consolidation must
1. In this Note, "separation of powers" refers to a dispersion of governmental authority among
distinct governmental entities. See infra text accompanying notes 5-11. Contemporary analysts disagree sharply over the precise features inherent in, or required by, such dispersion, see infra Part I,
Section C, but the definition adopted here is intended to capture the common core of the various
conceptions of separated powers employed by commentators and by the Court: power spread among
many hands, not concentrated in one.
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be sufficient to permit activist regulation. At the same time, the traditional
principle of separation of powers remains vital, though limited in scope.
The "separation principle" provides the theory's second tier: The ultimate
power of control over agencies must be divided among the original three
branches.
Part III explains the Burger Supreme Court's two landmark separation
of powers decisions2 as motivated by this two-tiered approach. The
Court's rejection of the legislative ve.u illustrates the consolidation principle. The veto was an attempt by Congress to interfere with the ability of
administrative agencies to pursue interventionist agenda. In contrast, the
Court demonstrated the continued force of the separation principle by invalidating the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget balancing law. 3 GrammRudman-Hollings represented a congressional attempt to exclude the
President from participation in ultimate control over the agencies.
Part IV, applying the two-tiered framework elaborated in earlier Parts
to an issue of current importance, argues that portions of the Competition
in Contracting Act" (CICA) are unconstitutional. Like the legislative veto,
CICA disrupts the consolidation of operational power within administrative agencies.
Finally, Part V offers some normative justifications for a two-tiered
theory.
I.

THE CHALLENGE: THE LEGACY OF THE NEW DEAL

The Constitution has traditionally been read to embody a theory of separation of powers. I> In Federalist Nos. 47-51, Madison establishes the link
between liberty and a struggle for power among governmental institutions:
"[W]here the whole po~ver of one department is exercised by the same
hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted."6 To safeguard
against unconstitutional abuses of government authority, the Founders
limited the Federal Government's ability to act by dividing its power
among distinct branches. 7 Any of the branches, by refusing to exercise its
share, can prevent government action that violates the Constitution.
2. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (overturning Gramm-Rudman-HoIlings deficit reduction act); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (declaring legislative vetoes unconstitutional).
3. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177,99 Stat.
1038, 1063-93 (current version at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-909 (1988».
4. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3556 (Supp. V 1987).
5. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) Uackson, j.,
concurring); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803); Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4
DaIl.) 14, 18-19 (1800) (opinion of Chase, j.).
6. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 302-03 U. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis in original). This passage is quoted approvingly in the Supreme Court's most recent separation of powers
decision. Mistretta v. U.S., 109 S. Ct. 647, 659 (1989).
7. Although the Constitution divides power among three branches, this Note is concerned only
with the relationship between Congress and the President. Broadening the argument to include Fed-
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Two Aspects of the Separation of Powers

The Federalist identifies two aspects of an effective separation of powers. First, the branches must be institutionally independent so that no
branch can fall under the control of the others. Federalist No. 51 sets out
the structural requirements for institutional independence: "[T]he members of each [branch] should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. . . . [And] the members of each
[branch] should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others for
the emoluments annexed to their offices."8
Second, the branches must be functionally specialized. Each branch
must be given a meaningful share of power so that the government can act
only with the willing participation of all three. The Federalist envisions
that these functional assignments will be related to each branch's institutional competence, resulting in specialization and an efficient division of
labor. The Congress, due to its high degree of representativeness and accountability, will best understand the "passions"9 of the electorate, suiting
it best to articulate basic policy norms. The more removed, statesmanlike
President will "reason right about the means of promoting [goals determined by the legislature]."lo The completely insulated, life-tenured Federal judiciary will "have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment
"11

B.

The Rise and Decline of the Nondelegation Doctrine

From the beginning of the Republic until the New Deal period, the
Supreme Court gave expression to this Federalist theory of separation of
powers through the nondelegation doctrine, which held that the lawmaking power delegated by the people to Congress in the Constitution could
not be redelegated by Congress to the executive. 12 The Court recognized
that the President would exercise discretion in administering the laws, but
insisted that congressional enactments cabin this discretion with specific
instructions.
This position is exemplified by J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United
eral courts is beyond the scope of this Note. Some implications for the judiciary are suggested infra at
note 55.
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). These requirements are
effected by the Constitution in the incompatibility clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, d. 2, the appointments clause, id. art. II, § 2, c1. 2, and the presidential and judicial compensation clauses, id. art. II, §
1, d. 7; id. art. III, § 1.
9. THE FElJERALlST No. 49, at 317 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis omitted).
10. [d. No. 71, at 432 (A. Hamilton) (emphasis in original).
11. [d. No. 78, at 465 (A. Hamilton) (emphasis in original).
12. See generally G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 365-71 (1986) (discussing rise and fall of nondelegation doctrine). For early statements of the
nondelegation doctrine, see Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1,42-43 (1825); Cargo of the
Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 388 (1813) (permitting embargo conditioned
upon presidential findings); see also cases cited infra at note 17.
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States. 13 Hampton upheld a "flexible tariff' provlSlon authorizing the
President to adjust import duties to "equalize ... differences in costs of
production in the United States and the principal competing country."!·
The Court ruled that this provision did not constitute a "delegation to the
President of the legislative power»lll because it established an "intelligible
principle" for the executive to obey.16 By forbidding the President from
legislating, the nondelegation doctrine both preserved the branches' functional specialization and prevented centralization of power in the
executive. 17
The Court's reliance on the nondelegation doctrine reached a crescendo
in the early New Deal period, as President Roosevelt's innovations accelerated the concentration of Federal Government power within the executive branch. Faced with these rapid changes, the Court in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan 18 and in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States 19 struck down the New Deal's centerpiece National Industrial Recovery Act,20 declaring: "The Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to
transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is ...
vested. "21
After the election of 1936, however, the Supreme Court abruptly reversed ground, ending its opposition to the New Deal and permitting
large grants of power to the executive. 22 In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
13. 276 u.s. 394 (1928).
14. Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858 at 941-42, § 315(a).
15. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 404.
16. Id. at 409.
17. Despite its repeated invocations of the nondelegation doctrine, the Court did not actually
strike down a congressional delegation until the New Deal. See N.Y. Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United
States, 287 U.S. 12, 24-26 (1932) (upholding ICC authority to approve mergers); Tagg Bros. &
Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 436-39 (1930) (upholding authority of Secretary of Agriculture to prescribe industry-wide tariffs); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 516-21 (1911)
(permitting Agriculture Secretary to regulate forest preserves); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470,
496-97 (1904) (permitting Treasury Secretary to issue standards); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692
(1892) (permitting import duties conditioned upon presidential finding). Perhaps one reading of this
history would see the nondelegation doctrine as practically meaningless. But this would fail to credit
the Court's efforts to accommodate the incipient national administrative state within the Federalist
constitutional framework-until the New Deal expansion rendered the Court's delicate accommodation untenable. For a description of the development of Federal administrative capabilities during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see S. SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN
STATE 47-68 (1982).
18. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
19. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
20. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (omitted from United States
Code due to unconstitutionality).
21. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 529.
22. Professor Ackerman has argued that the election of 1936 effected a constitutional amendment.
Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 1989); Ackerman,
The StoTrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1051-57 (1984). My argument in this Note does not require acceptance of Professor Ackerman's thesis, although I find in it
much to credit. Whether the Court recognized in 1937 that We the People had authorized an activist
state, or whether the Justices were simply persuaded by the New Dealers' strenuous attacks on the
philosophical underpinnings of the early Hughes Court's laissez-faire regime, I claim only that the
Court's separation of powers jurisprudence experienced a major shift in the 1930's and that later
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Steel Corp. ,23 the Court, without mentioning the nondelegation doctrine,
upheld Congress' establishment of a National Labor Relations Board with
complete power to regulate labor unions and labor-management relations. 24 Even Justice McReynolds' dissent takes for granted that the delegation of authority is legitimate: "The precise question for us to determine
is whether . . . Congress by statute [could] direct what the Board has
ordered."25
By 1944, the Court in Yakus v. United States2 6 was willing to permit
an essentially standardless delegation. Yakus approved a Price Administrator with the authority to set commodity prices and rents that were "fair
and equitable" and that would "effectuate . . . purposes" including stabilizing prices, preventing speculation, assisting the defense effort, and protecting people with fixed incomes. 27 The Yakus Court contented itself
with the observation that Congress had "specified the basic conditions of
fact" necessitating the delegation. 28 While the Court never acknowledged
its repudiation of Schechter/Panama reasoning, it drained the nondelegation doctrine of useful meaning. 29
C.

The Contemporary Separation of Powers Debate

In repudiating the non delegation doctrine, the Supreme Court approved
centralization of policy-making authority. The task of giving constitutional meaning to this monumental event has raised difficulties for contemporary separation of powers analysts, who have identified two approaches: a pure-separation approach emphasizing "the constitutional
effort to allocate different sorts of power among three [different] government entities" and a partial-separation approach focusing on the "constitutional effort to ... guard against the usurpation of authority by anyone
branch."30
decisions have attempted to integrate this shift into the pre-existing framework.
23. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
24. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372,49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. V 1987».
25. Labor Board Cases, 301 U.S. 1,93 (1937) (McReynolds,]., dissenting).
26. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
27. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 at 23-25, §§ l(a), 2(a).
28. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 424; see also Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 778 (1948) ("A
constitutional power implies a power of delegation of authority under it sufficient to effect its purposes.") (emphasis in original); United States v. Rock-Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533, 574 (1939) (congressional delegations "need specify only so far as is reasonably practicable"); Currin v. Wallace, 306
U.S. 1, 17 (1939) (delegation to Agriculture Secretary of power to establish standards is "plainly
appropriate").
29. The Court has tacitly acknowledged the New Deal transformation most recently in Mistretta
v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 655 (1989) (footnotes and citations omitted): "After invalidating in
1935 two statutes as excessive delegations, see A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States and
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, we have upheld, again without deviation, Congress' ability to delegate
power under broad standards." The Mistretta Court, relying primarily on Yakus, rejected a nondelegation doctrine challenge to a Sentencing Commission empowered to establish sentences for most Federal crimes. ld. at 654-58. See infra note 84.
30. G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, supra note 12, at 342 (distinguishing
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Scholars in the partial-separation camp see the demise of the nondelegation doctrine-and the concomitant concentration of power within administrative agencies-as necessitating abandonment of traditional separation of powers insistence on functional specialization. 31 By promulgating
rules, implementing policies, and making case-by-case determinations,
these agencies combine all three facets of governance. Partialist commentators contend that modern separation of powers theory cannot, consistent
with this reality, contain a strict requirement of functional specialization.
Instead, the partial-separation approach develops the insight that the
fundamental goal of separated powers is to give each branch a veto over
government action. This objective requires only that government power be
divided among independent branches. Rather than policing the branches'
functional specialization, the Court's role is limited to safeguarding the
basic structural requisites for each branch's independence and to ensuring
that none is wholly excluded from the governing process.32 Partialist
scholars thus support measures to give Congress some control over the
executive agencies; they deem it more important to counter the threat of
congressional marginalization posed by the agencies' power than to maintain a rigid boundary between the legislative and executive functions. 33
The pure-separation approach, professing fidelity to the Founders' vision,3. rejects this partialist encroachment on functional purity: "[T]he
Constitution makes clear that the executive and judicial branches have no
legislative power; that no part of the judicial power is conferred on the
legislature or the executive; and that only the executive branch can exer"separation of powers" approach from "checks and balances" approach); if. M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 13-20 (1967) (distinguishing between pure and partial approaches); Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate About Legislative-Executive Separation of
Powers,72 CORNELL L. REV. 430, 434-36 (1987) (distinguishing separation of powers from checks
and balances); Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-ofPowers Questions-A
Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987) (distinguishing formal and functional
approaches); Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 493-96
(1987) (same).
31. See, e.g., G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, supra note 12, at 342;
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 573, 578-79 (1984).
32. Although partialists often refer to the ineradicable bedrock of institutional independence possessed by each branch as "core functions," this terminology is somewhat misleading. The logical essence of the partialist position only requires that there be bedrock powers, not that these powers have
any particular functional cast. The three branches might be called the Dodgers, the Giants and the
Yankees as well as the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, provided that each retains a veto
over government action.
33. See, e.g., Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater'! A Comment on the Supreme Court's
Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789, 812-16.
34. See, e.g., Burns & Markman, Understanding Separation of Powers, 7 PACE L. REV. 575,
578 (1987); Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and Subsequent De-Evolution of the
Separation of Powers, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 720. Detractors of the pure approach also characterize it as originalist. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967-1003 (1983) (White, J., dissenting);
Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law By Any Other Name'!, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 3
(1984).
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cise executive power."35 The pure-separation approach would therefore
resist congressional attempts to exercise control over administrative agencies, even at the risk of executive domination. 36 Purist scholars either ignore the broad authority possessed by agencies, implicitly denying that
this authority contravenes the separation of powers,37 or call for a revival
of the nondelegation doctrine to eliminate agency lawmaking. 38 While
most academic commentators favor a partial-separation approach,39 much
recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has been read as exemplifying a
pure-separation approach.40

II.

THE SOLUTION: A Two-TIERED THEORY OF ALLOCATION OF
POWER

Framing debate between the poles of the pure-separation and partialseparation approaches compels a choice between functional specialization
and institutional independence. The pure-separation approach seeks to
preserve specialization but countenances centralization of power in a single branch-the executive. The partial-separation approach permits a
countervailing increase in congressional power, but only by accepting a
mixture of functions. Both approaches, then, interpret Jones & Laughlin
and Yakus as compromising the Federalist principle of separation of powers by requiring retreat from one of its two aspects.
I propose instead a two-tiered theory of allocation of power, with one
set of rules applicable to exercises of power by administrative agencies and
another set of rules applicable to interactions among the original three
branches. This theory is motivated by two perceptions: first, that the demise of the nondelegation doctrine constituted a positive affirmation of the
activist state; and, second, that this affirmation must be understood in the
context of an overarching system of separated powers.

A.

The Principle of Consolidation of Power

In a way, my reading of Jones & Laughlin and Yakus goes further
than either the pure-separation approach or the partial-separation approach: Not only did these decisions run directly contrary to the Federalist
principle of separation, but they were animated instead by a principle of
consolidation. This consolidation principle requires, rather than merely
35. Burns & Markman, supra note 34, at 579.
36. See, e.g., Currie, The Distribution of Powers After Bowsher, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 19,32-34.
37. See, e.g., id.; Burns & Markman, supra note 34.
38. See Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress and Executive Policy-Making: Notes on Three Doctrines,
40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 46, 49-65 (Summer, 1976).
39. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18-20 (2d ed. 1988); Bruff, On the
Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 491, 493-95 (1987); Strauss,
supra note 30, at 492; Sunstein, supra note 30, at 496. But see, e.g., Carter, supra note 34; Currie,
supra note 36.
40. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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accepts, government agencies that combine legislative, executive, and judicial functions within a single institution.
In this view, the Court's precipitous shift in 1937 signaled the constitutionalization of an activist regulatory state. The non delegation doctrine
was inconsistent with this new regime, and so the Court abandoned it.
But the Court's rejection of pre-New Deal separation of powers jurisprudence did not leave a void, permitting Congress and the President to array
the Federal Government as they saw fit. Rather, the New Deal challenged
the Court to elaborate a positive vision of a constitutional order based on
government activismY
The keystone of this vision is the perception that an activist national
government cannot be encumbered by multi-branch checks and balances.
Separated powers, by affording each of three branches the opportunity to
prevent government action, effectively inhibit regulation. The New Deal
rejected such constraints, introducing an activist imperative into the Federal Government's structure. This imperative demands that administrative
agencies be free to regulate without having to wait for agreement among
the three branches-without, that is, the restraints of separated powers.
While the Federalist principle of separation of powers forbids exclusion of
any of the three branches from the policy-making process, the New Deal
principle of consolidation of power mandates that this process be the exclusive domain of a single entity.42 The effect of the New Deal is that
government inaction is no longer the privileged baseline condition from
which any departure requires the agreement of all three branches; instead,
intervention is the default position.

B. Operational Power and Ultimate Power
At the same time, my interpretation of the demise of the nondelegation
doctrine finds a greater continuity with Federalist ideals than does either
the purist or the partialist approach. In recognizing the force of the consolidation principle, I do not claim that the Court has superseded, or even
compromised, the Federalist principle of separation of powers. Rather, the
Court has resolved the apparent conflict between these two principles
through a two-tiered theory of allocation of power.
41. There may indeed have been such a void for a period of time following the Court's New Deal
reversal. For example, Justice Jackson's "twilight zone" formulation is concerned exclusively with the
relative powers of Congress and of the President; Jackson appears to assume that there are no constitutional limits to the ability of the two branches jointly to structure government action. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) Oackson, j., concurring). I conjecture that in th~ immediate aftermath of Roosevelt's sweeping victories, it may have seemed to the
Justices that the lesson of the New Deal was that limits on Federal Government structure-enforced
separation between the legislative and executive powers-had been eradicated. Only over time has the
Court been able to discern the New Deal's positive dimension, and accordingly to construct new,
activist requirements.
42. Not all governmental power must be consolidated, as we shall see. See infra Part II, Section

B.
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To reconcile the opposing principles, the Court has had to bifurcate its
view of government power43 into two distinct spheres of application, one
employing the principle of separation and one requiring the consolidation
principle. Bifurcation limits the scope of both the consolidation principle
and the separation principle, enabling a jurisprudence that accommodates
both.
In deciding which principle to apply, the guiding postulate must be that
the consolidation principle is to apply only to operational power-that
amount of the government's power required by activist agencies to formulate and implement policy. This requirement links application of the consolidation principle directly to the New Deal goal of facilitating government activism. The separation principle requires division between
Congress and the President of the ultimate power to govern the agencies
-to decide how they are to be structured, who is to staff them, what
areas they are to regulate, and how resources are to be allocated among
them. 44
In sharpening the distinction between operational and ultimate power,
care must be taken not simply to equate operational power with the work
of the administrative agencies. Such a definition would be circular. 415 Nor
can operational power be defined functionally. Dissolving power into
functional components is useful only if it is to be shared by differentiated
actors. 46 But administrative agencies must be self-sufficient; they must be
able to exercise all of the functional aspects of power.
These two dead ends point out that the essential characteristic of the
authority possessed by administrative agencies has nothing to do with how
the agencies are structured and nothing to do with the forms by which
they exercise authority, but it has everything to do with the power relationship between the agencies and the private actors they regulate. This
suggests a definition of operational power based on the object of power:
Operational power includes all exercises of power aimed directly at private individuals or groups, while ultimate power is exercised over other
governmental actors. 47 This distinction gives effect to the consolidation
43. By "exercises of power" I mean to refer to any authoritative statement as to the orientation of
the state or of state actors towards private individuals or groups, other state actors or entities, or
foreign persons or entities.
44. Compare this formulation with M. VILE, supra note 30, at 329-39 (describing tension between coordination and control in government). See also Strauss, supra note 31 (three original
branches share control of administrative agencies).
45. If the consolidation principle requires operational power to be centralized within executive
agencies, and operational power is defined simply as the work of those agencies, then the consolidation
principle will, by definition, always be satisfied. For the consolidation principle to be meaningful,
operational power must be defined without reference to the institutional structures on which the principle acts.
46. Indeed, legislation (or execution or adjudication) is a sensible concept only in relation to other
modes of exercising power.
47. Although limited to the sphere of ultimate power, within that sphere the separation principle
can be retained in its full vigor by dividing ultimate power among branches that are both institution-
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principle, but not at the expense of separated powers; the point at which
the separation principle obtains has simply been pushed back so that not
all policy-making authority need be divided. Control of the bureaucratic
apparatus, but not particular administrative initiatives, requires agreement among the original branches.
The distinction between operational power and ultimate power is best
elaborated through case law, and my discussion in the following Part III
may provide some illumination. 48 But a potentially confusing issue should
be clarified at the outset: One component of ultimate power is the ability
to determine what areas of society are to be regulated. The consolidation
principle does not guarantee the jurisdiction of any particular administrative agency, nor the satisfaction of any particular societal need or interest.
So defined, the distinction between operational power and ultimate power
may appear to collapse: The ability to set regulatory goals, one might
think, surely subsumes the ability to structure the policy-making process
for accomplishing those goals-the ability, in other words, to draw the
line between operational and ultimate power. I insist, however, that the
branches do not have a free hand in structuring policy-making processes.
The consolidation principle constrains: If an area is to be regulated,
power to regulate autonomously must be centralized within the agencies.
Congress and the President may not agree to divide operational power.
This, I now argue, is the lesson of INS v. Chadha. 49
III.

EVIDENCE FOR A Two-TIERED THEORY: THE BURGER COURT
DECISIONS

Twice near the end of its tenure, the Burger Supreme Court struck
down important legislation purporting to allocate power between Congress and the President. 50 Because the language of these opinions emphasizes rigid boundaries between the executive and legislative branches, they
have been received by both purists51 and partialists52 as evidencing a purally independent and functionally specialized. Thus Congress should oversee the agencies in a way
that is distinctly legislative, the President should exercise her share of ultimate authority in a way that
is distinctly executive, and Federal courts should review agency decisions in a way that is distinctly
judicial. For a suggestion as to what these restrictions might look like in the case of Congress, see J.
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 90 (1980) ("Ex Post Facto and
Bill of Attainder Clauses . . . [are] separation of powers provisions, enjoining the legislature to act
prospectively and by general rule").
48. See infra text accompanying note 60 (power to deport aliens is operational power); text accompanying note 83 (power to allocate funding among agencies is ultimate power); note 71 (power to
restructure administrative agencies and power to allocate funding are ultimate powers).
49. 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (declaring legislative vetoes unconstitutional).
50. [d.; Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (overturning Gramm-Rudman-HoIlings deficit
reduction act).
51. See, e.g., Burns & Markman, supra note 34, at 590-93; Carter, supra note 34, at 731-36;
Currie, supra note 36, at 30, 33.
52. See, e.g., Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 776 (White, J., dissenting); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967-1003
(White, J., dissenting); Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 323, 323 (1987);
Strauss, supra note 33, at 794-80; Sunstein, supra note 30, at 493; Tribe, supra note 34, at 1-3.
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ist, "distinctly non-New Deal"53 VISIon of separated powers. Actually,
these cases provide strong support for the hypothesis that the Court has
responded to the New Deal by creating a two-tiered doctrine of allocation
of power. 54 The Court in INS v. Chadha applied the consolidation principle to strike down an attempt by Congress to exercise operational power.
In contrast, Bowsher v. Synar displays the continued vitality of the separation principle-limited in scope to cases involving ultimate power-by
ensuring that Congress shares with the President the power to allocate
funding among agencies (see Figure 1).55
Figure 1
Case

Type of Power
at Stake

Principle Employed
by Court

Chadha

operational

consolidation

Bowsher

ultimate

separation

A.

The Legislative Veto Case

In Chadha, the Court struck down a portion of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA).56 The INA grants to the Attorney General (the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is part of the Justice Department) discretion to suspend deportation of an otherwise deportable
alien,57 but a "legislative veto" provision enabled either house of ConAman, Introduction, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 421, 426 (1987).
I cannot plausibly suggest that any of the Justices joining the majorities in Chadha and Bowsher, much less the author of the majority opinions, explicitly subscribes to the two-tiered theory of
allocation of power that I have outlined. Indeed, the originalist rhetoric of the opinions gives no
indication of a principle of consolidation, or of a distinction between operational and ultimate power.
Nonetheless, it is part of my argument that the intuitions of the Justices who decided these cases were
shaped importantly by a recognition of the two-tiered structure of the post-New Deal Federal Government. This claim is corollary to my contention that the Court's turn-around in 1937 announced a
new and enduring constitutional principle. My argument is not simply that Chadha and Bowsher are
consistent with the two-tiered theory, but that these decisions were compelled by the Court's effort to
integrate the New Deal's constitutionalization of government activism into the preexisting framework
of separated powers.
55. Two other Burger Court separation of powers decisions are worthy of mention. Both concern
the authority of officials outside the Federal judiciary (so-called "legislative courts") to adjudicate
individual disputes. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (permitting
CFTC to decide state-law counterclaims); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50 (1982) (declaring bankruptcy courts unconstitutional). Without attempting a full-scale
application of the two-tiered approach to the judiciary, I suggest that these decisions must be understood as differentiating between operational power and ultimate power. Part of the operational power
indispensible to administrative agencies is the ability to apply law to individual cases in the first
instance. The CFTC's claim to this power as necessary to its regulatory program is vindicated in
Schor. At the same time, the ability of Article III courts to exercise the ultimate power to adjudicate
the constitutionality of agency structure and procedures cannot be eviscerated; this concern drove the
decision in Northern Pipeline.
56. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 166 (1952) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1988».
57. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1988). Congress directed the Attorney General to suspend deportation in
53.
54.
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gress, by majority vote, to overrule such a suspension. 58 The Court invalidated this provision as violating the bicameral passage and presentment
requirements of Article I of the Constitution. 59
Commentators err by accepting at face value the purist rhetoric of
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion. In fact, Chadha is not at all concerned with the separation of powers; it is driven instead by the consolidation principle. The legislative veto is unconstitutional because it enables
Congress to exercise some of the operational power that should be centralized within the INS.
The deportation power qualifies as operational under the two-tiered
definition. It is intimately bound up with the day-to-day process of interaction between the INS and the private individuals it governs. More generally, discretionary power over deportation is essential to the INS' ability
to regulate citizenship. Any INS effort to carry out immigration policy on
its own would be completely hamstrung if the INS were forced to gain
congressional assent to each use of the only tool at its disposal-deportation. To avoid this danger, the Court recognized, the deportation power must be consolidated within the INS.
My rebuttal to the conventional misreading of Chadha is twofold. First,
I want to debunk the surface illusion that the case is only about procedural constraints on Congressional action.6o Chadha-indeed any decision
about how Congress can exercise its power-necessarily depends on an
analysis of the limits of Congress' power in relation to the executive
branch. Second, I want to show that the Court's implicit analysis of these
limits cannot be understood as protecting the separation between Congress
and the President, but only as guaranteeing consolidation of operational
power within an administrative agency.
1.

Explaining the Chadha Opinion

The Chadha decision appears to rest on its definition of legislative action. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger quotes extensively from
Article I and from The Federalist to establish that all legislative acts must
be passed by both houses of Congress and be presented to the President
for signature or veto. 61 But while legislation certainly requires bicameral
cases of "extreme hardship" or "extremely unusual hardship." Id.
58. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 244, 66 Stat. 163, 214-17 (1952),
repealed by Immigration Technical Corrections Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-525, §2(q)(I)(b), 1988
U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 2609, 2614.
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, d. 2: "Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President ...."
60. My analysis of Chadha draws on the following articles: Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution and the Legislative Veto, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 131-44;
Sargentich, supra note 30, at 468-77; Strauss, supra note 33, at 794-801; Tribe, supra note 34, at
3-18.
61. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945-51.
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passage and presentment, the Court's argument begs the real question of
whether the veto is indeed legislation. 62 In dissent, Justice White offers an
alternative characterization. He portrays the veto resolution not as an independent legislative event but as part of a comprehensive process that
begins with Congress' delegation, continues through the INS' administrative determinations, and is completed (case-by-case) by either Congress'
veto or its tacit consent. 63
Choosing between these competing characterizations requires an inquiry into the veto device's consequences for the allocation of power between Congress and the President. This inquiry is absent from the
Chadha opinion. Instead, Burger provides a simplistic definition of legislation that is both overbroad and circular: The veto resolution is legislation because it "alter[s] the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons."64
This formulation is overbroad because executive rulemaking, agency determinations, and judicial decisions all alter legal rights, yet none comply
with Article I requirements for legislation. More fatal, as Professor Elliott
observes, the "legislative veto 'alters legal rights' . . . only because the
Court chooses to characterize its effect that way."65 By treating a deportable alien's legal right to a suspension as perfecting prior to congressional
failure to veto, Burger assumes his conclusion.
Ultimately, then, Burger's characterization of the veto as legislative
rests on his statement that "[w]hen any Branch acts, it is presumptively
exercising the power the Constitution has delegated to it."66 Burger's circular definition of legislation makes this presumption dispositive. As Professor Sargentich notes: "[T]his analysis appears to collapse the concepts
of the action involved (lawmaking) and the actor undertaking the action
(Congress)."67 The true focus of Chadha is not the definitional boundaries of the legislative function, but the limits imposed by Congress' relationship to the executive branch.
2.

Chadha as an Application of the Consolidation Principle

Commentators who reach this point, realizing that Chadha rests on an
unstated analysis of the appropriate allocation of power between the legislature and the executive, assume that the holding is motivated by a concern to further the separation between the legislative and executive pow62. Burger concedes that not every congressional action is to be considered legislation. Id. at 952.
The language of Article I itself contemplates non-legislative congressional action: "Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to Which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary ...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
63. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 994-95 (White, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 952.
65. Elliott, supra note 60, at 134; see also Sargentich, supra note 30, at 471 (demonstrating
circularity of Chadha's definition of legislation); Strauss, supra note 33, at 796 (same).
66. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 95l.
67. Sargentich, supra note 30, at 472.
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ers. 6S But the internal logic of this putative Chadha position simply does
not make sense. The legislative veto does not contravene Federalist division-of-power interests; rather, it furthers them. Most administrative
agencies, including the INS, are controlled by the President. 69 Denying
Congress the legislative veto ensures that policy-making will be dominated
by the President. In the context of a government composed primarily of
large executive bureaucracies, the legislative veto would result in an uneasy sharing of power by Congress and the President-exactly the Federalist prescription.
To put this point another way, Chadha demonstrates that the Court
has bifurcated its understanding of governmental power. Justice White's
dissent points out that, far from being "a sword with which Congress has
struck out to aggrandize itself at the expense of the other branches," the
legislative veto merely allows Congress to retain some control over policymaking. 70 If the Court held a single-tiered view of governmental power,
Justice White would surely be correct; the veto enables some redress for
what is otherwise an imbalance of power in favor of the executive.
The Court's two-tiered approach, however, means that not every power
imbalance is to be redressed. Specifically, operational power wielded by
administrative agencies need not be dispersed; indeed, it must be consolidated. The Court will step in to ensure division only when the ultimate
power of control over these agencies threatens to become concentrated. Because the Court in Chadha is concerned with operational power, not ultimate power, it applies the principle of consolidation.71
68. See, e.g., Burns & Markman, supra note 34, at 590-93; Carter, supra note 34, at 739; Elliott, supra note 60, at 146-47; Sargentich, supra note 30, at 469-70; Tribe, supra note 34, at 17.
69. The two-tiered theory does not demand that agencies be located in the executive branch. The
consolidation principle requires only that operational power be centralized within administrative
agencies, not that it be wholly under presidential control. Congress has some flexibility in structuring
the precise relationship between the agencies and the President. Agency location can, however, present
separation-principle problems. See infra note 84.
70. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 974 (White, J., dissenting).
71. Chadha was written too broadly, however, because not all legislative veto structures would be
unconstitutional. Some exercises of government power-those involving ultimate power-are properly
made contingent upon interbranch agreement (under the separation principle). Because the consolidation principle applies only when operational power is at stake, the legislative veto is unconstitutional
only when used to exercise operational power; a veto exercised in an area of ultimate power-for
example, the budget power or the power to restructure administrative agencies-would be valid. CJ.
Strauss, supra note 33, at 805-17 (distinguishing between constitutional "political" vetoes and unconstitutional "regulatory" vetoes).
There is some indication that lower Federal courts have appreciated this distinction in post-Chadha
legislative veto cases. One issue in Chadha was the severability oC the legislative veto. The Court
could have used the unconstitutionality oC the veto to invalidate the Justice Department's discretionary
power over deportation. Instead, the Court chose to sever the veto provision from the remainder of the
INA, leaving intact its broad delegation of authority to the Justice Department. Chadha, 462 U.S. at
931-35. But see id. at 1013-16 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting on ground that veto not severable). This
result is compelled by the consolidation principle-because the deportation power is operational and
must be leCt with the INS-and the general rule has been that vetoes are severable. See Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678 (1987) (severing veto in duty-to-hire statute).
This rule makes sense in most legislative veto cases, because the power at issue is operational and
must be given to administrative agencies. But where the power at issue is ultimate power, severing a
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The premise underlying Chadha-that the power to suspend deportations is operational, and therefore subject to the consolidation principle-becomes evident in Burger's response to a nondelegation doctrine
challenge to the INA. After dismissing the challenge, citing Yakus,72 the
opinion then declares that "Congress' authority to delegate portions of its
power to administrative agencies provides no support for the argument
that Congress can constitutionally control administration of the laws by
way of a congressional veto."73 Burger's objection to the veto is not that it
fails to meet the procedural requirements of Article I but that it permits
Congress to meddle in the work of administrative agencies.
Chadha is comprehensible-and defensible-only as a vindication of
the consolidation principle." The legislative veto is offensive not because
it permits centralization but because it interferes with centralization. In
violation of the consolidation principle, the veto makes every exercise of
governmental power contingent upon interbranch agreement.

B. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Case
While Chadha demonstrates the Supreme Court's endorsement of the
consolidation principle, Bowsher v. Synar76 shows that the principle of
separation continues to play an important role in the Court's jurisprudence. In Bowsher, the Court invalidated portions of the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985,76 popularly known as
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. This Act authorized the Comptroller General
to direct Federal spending reductions in the event that the annual budget
passed by Congress failed to meet specified deficit targets.
The Court held that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings gave the Comptroller
legislative veto provision will centralize power that ought to be divided; in such cases, courts should
strike down the entire statute. Cf. Note, Resolving Challenges to Statutes Containing Unconstitutional Legislative Veto Provisions, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1808, 1820-31 (1985) (severability issue
should be resolved according to importance to Congress of power involved). Two courts of appeals, in
cases involving ultimate power, have diverged from the general rule and invalidated statutes rather
than leaving in place broad delegations of authority to the executive. City of New Haven, Conn. v.
United States, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (invalidating statute giving President broad power to
revise budgetary allocations by impounding funds); EEOC v. CBS, Inc., 743 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1984)
(invalidating statute delegating to President power to reorganize agencies). But see Muller Optical Co.
v. EEOC, 743 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1984) (upholding change in agency structure pursuant to Reorganization Act without considering severability issue).
72. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 n.16.
73. [d. at 954 n.16. The connection Burger draws between delegation and administration mirrors
the relationship between the demise of the nondelegation doctrine and the birth of the consolidation
principle: The New Deal eliminated one set of constitutional constraints on Federal Government
structure (non delegation) but it replaced the obsolete doctrine with a new set of structural requirements incorporating the idea of consolidation.
74. Readers who find my reading of Chadha in tension with what they consider to be Chief
Justice Burger's ideological predispositions should note that the majority opinion was joined by J ustices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, O'Connor, and Stevens.
75. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
76. Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038, 1063-93 (current version codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-909
(198B».
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General, an officer of Congress, powers analogous to an unconstitutional
legislative veto: unilateral lawmaking by Congress without bicameral passage or presentment to the President. Chief Justice Burger's majority
opinion begins by citing Chadha for the proposition that Congress may
not perform executive duties: "To permit an officer controlled by Congress to execute the laws would be, in essence, to permit a congressional
veto."77 The rest of the opinion establishes the two premises for a violation under this proposition: that the power to order budget cuts is an executive responsibility78 and that the Comptroller General is in fact controlled by Congress. 79
The latter claim has been hotly disputed both by academics80 and by
the other Justices writing opinions in Bowsher.81 Burger's assertion that
the Comptroller General is a congressional agent is founded entirely on
Congress' ability, by joint resolution (which must be signed by the President), to remove him for cause. Burger makes no inquiry into the actual
relationship between the Comptroller General and members of Congress.
In light of the tenuous (arguably nonexistent) control Congress has over
the Comptroller General, Justice Blackmun is justified in questioning the
77. 478 u.s. at 726. Incidentally, this quotation provides further support for the reading of
Chadha advanced earlier. See supra text accompanying notes 60-74. The Bowsher Court's restatement of the Chadha holding makes clear that the Court-in retrospect, at least-found the legislative
veto offensive due to the power it gave Congress over the administrative agencies.
78. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732-33.
79. ld. at 727.
80. See Elliott, Regulating the Deficit After Bowsher v. Synar, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 317, 323
(1987); Levinson, Balancing Acts: Bowsher v. Synar, Gramm-Rudman.Hollings and Be)'ond. 72
CORNELL L. REV. 527, 535-37 (1987).
81. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 739 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 777 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); id. at 770-75 (White, J., dissenting) (Comptroller General is "one of the most independent officers in the entire federal establishment . . . . [Congress' alleged control is) wholly
chimerical.").
Burger's characterization of the Comptroller General's responsibilities under Gramm-RudmanHollings as executive is equally subject to attack. The majority opinion states: "Interpreting a law
. . . to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of 'execution' of the law. Under [the Act)
the Comptroller General must exercise judgment concerning facts that affect the application of the
Act." ld. at 732-33. But as Professor Elliott notes, this definition is "utterly vapid and without content." Elliott, supra note 80, at 326. Interpretation of the law and judgment concerning facts would
seem, if anything, to be hallmarks of the adjudicative function rather than the executive.
Burger's choice is especially interesting because classifying the Comptroller General's budgetary
powers as legislative rather than executive would have disposed of the case immediately. Given that
the Comptroller General is considered to be an agent of Congress, a delegation of legislative authority
would present a case identical to Chadha.
The Court could easily have taken this course. The powers given to the Comptroller General are
just as "legislative" as the Chadha veto, if not more so. The budget cuts mandated by the Comptroller
General replace resolutions that would otherwise need to be passed by Congress. Further, budgeting,
unlike immigration policy, begins and ends with the legislative process; it has no administrative component. The Court's choice to call the Comptroller General's powers "executive" signals a crucial
difference between the analytic underpinnings of Chadha and Bowsher. Chadha involved operational
power, and therefore applied the consolidation principle; Bowsher involved ultimate power, trig~ering
the separation principle. The rhetoric of the two cases, however, is precisely backwards. With the
legislative veto, Congress improperly involved itself in administration, notwithstanding the Chadha
opinion's emphasis on defining "legislation." In Bowsher, though the opinion devotes its analysis to
defining the executive function, the power at stake is much closer to legislation.
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"sense of invalidating legislation of this magnitude in order to preserve a
cumbersome, 65-year-old removal power that has never been exercised
and appears to have been all but forgotten until this litigation."82
The answer to Justice Blackmun's question is that Gramm-RudmanHollings' delegation of budgeting authority was unconstitutional whether
the Comptroller General is considered to be an agent of Congress or an
agent of the President, or even the head of an administrative agency (the
General Accounting Office). In contrast to Chadha, Bowsher concerns ultimate power. Unlike the deportation power, which is a direct exercise of
policy-making authority over the clients of an administrative agency, the
budget acts on administrative agencies; it decides what areas of society the
government will regulate, and sets priorities among these areas. Consequently, exercise of the budget power is governed by the separation
principle.
Unlike the consolidation principle, which demands centralization, the
separation principle requires that power be shared among the branches.
Neither Congress nor the President may exclude the other from budgeting. Further, the budget power may not be delegated to an administrative
agency; such delegation would concentrate power Just as much as if Congress or the President were to gain complete control. 83 The status of the
Comptroller General, then, was irrelevant to Bowsher's outcome. Centralization of budgeting power doomed Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, rather
than the particular allegiance of the officer under whom power was consolidated. While Chadha applied the consolidation principle in the context
of an exercise of operational power, Bowsher involved a violation of the
separation principle in its sphere of appropriate application-the exercise
of ultimate power8' (refer again to Figure 1).
82. [d. at 778 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
83. In this sense, a "neo-nondelegation doctrine" has survived the New Deal as a component of
the separation principle: Congress retains a nondelegable share of ultimate power.
84. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). The Buckley Court declared
unconstitutional the structure of the Federal Elections Commission (FEC) because Congress appointed a majority of its voting members. This structure violated the separation principle. The appointment power-a power exercised over agency personnel, not over non-governmental actors-is
ultimate power, and the separation principle requires its division. Allowing one branch to control
appointment of agency heads would consolidate all governmental power, not just the operational
power required for activism.
It might seem that the FEC's commission structure perfectly satisfied separation principle imperatives by giving each branch a voice. But the authority to appoint a majority of the FEC empowered
Congress to render the President's contribution nugatory in the event of a conflict between the two
branches. The separation principle forbids such an arrogation; each branch must retain a veto over
exercises of ultimate power. The Court recognized this dictate by suggesting that the FEC be reformed so that Congress and the President would jointly appoint a majority of its members. [d. at
143.
Recently, the Court again confronted issues of agency control in Mistretta v. United States, 109 S.
Ct. 647 (1989). Mistretta upheld the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,18 U.S.C. § 3551-3580 (Supp.
V 1987).28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (Supp. V 1987), which created a Sentencing Commission staffed in
part by Federal judges. The Court recognized that the judges staffing the Sentencing Commission will
not be acting qua Federal judges, and therefore will not be subject to control by the Supreme Court
other than through the ordinary processes of judicial review; consequently, there is no danger that the
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The true doctrinal foundation of the Bowsher decision is reflected in the
Court's key statement of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings' flaw: "The executive
nature of the Comptroller General's functions under the Act [remember
that Burger has previously stated that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings is invalid if it gives the Comptroller General executive responsibilities] is revealed in § 2S2(a)(3) which gives the Comptroller General the ultimate
authority to determine the budget cuts to be made."sli It is this exercise of
"ultimate authority" by a single institution that established a constitutional violation.
Note, however, how difficult it was for the Court to arrive at the Bowsher holding. The Court's failure to develop explicitly the two-tiered
structure of constitutional restrictions on the Federal Government left no
doctrinal tool available to invalidate a delegation to the executive-short
of reviving the nondelegation doctrine, which the Court was unwilling to
do. This explains why Burger reached so far to classify the Comptroller
General as a congressional official: To challenge Gramm-RudmanHollings, the Court was forced to rely on a dubious removal argument.

IV.

ApPLYING THE Two-TIERED THEORY: THE COMPETITION IN
CONTRACTING ACT

Similar doctrinal contortions will undoubtedly continue to plague the
Court as it is presented with difficult cases involving the allocation of
power between Congress and the executive branch. For example, Bowsher
cast doubt on responsibilities assigned to the Comptroller General in as
many as forty-five statutes,S8 including the Competition in Contracting
Act (CICA)S7 which gives the Comptroller General a limited authority
over government procurement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit recently upheld the constitutionality of CICA in Lear Siegler,
Inc., Energy Products Division v. Lehman. s8 As I will show, however,
CICA violates the consolidation principle. My discussion of CICA will
suggest how courts may usefully apply the two-tiered theory when deciding future cases.
In addition, examining the Ninth Circuit's opinion upholding CICA
will illuminate the pitfalls created for lower courts by the disjunction beultimate power of control over the Commission will be concentrated in the Court. See Mistretta, 109
S. Ct. at 665-66 (Commission "is not controlled by or accountable to members of the Judicial Branch.
The Commission ... [is] "an independent agency, not a court . . . .").
85. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733.
86. See Ameron v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 809 F.2d 979, 1002-06 (3d Cir. 1986)
(Garth, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1218, cert. dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 297 (1988).
87. Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2701, 98 Stat. 1175, 11991203 (codified in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C. and 41 u.s. C.; controversial bid protest and stay
provisions codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3556 (Supp. V 1987».
88. 842 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988), modified by Nos. 86-6496, 87-5698, 87-5670 (9th Cir. July
17,1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, 9th file); see also Ameron, 809 F.2d at 988-98 (upholding constitutionality of CICA).
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tween the Supreme Court's rhetoric and the actual two-tiered constitutional framework. The erroneous Lear Siegler decision highlights the
need for the Supreme Court openly to confront the New Deal
transformation.
A.

Factual Background

Congress enacted CICA in 1984 in an attempt to exercise control over
the Federal procurement process. Congress has found Federal agencies,
defense agencies in particular, to be persistent in awarding negotiated
sole-source contracts89 despite Congress' repeated expressions of preference for competitive bidding. 90 CICA permits disappointed bidders to
bring claims of agency noncompliance with competitive bidding procedures to the Comptroller General for review. 91
Although the Comptroller General's recommendations carry no legal
force, CICA stays a contract award until the Comptroller General's investigation is complete. 92 Stays are intended to prevent agencies from circumventing the Comptroller General's intervention by rushing to begin execution of a contract upon the receipt of a bid protest. 93 The duration of the
stay is limited to ninety days,9' however, and the agency may override the
stay under "urgent and compelling circumstances."95

B. The Unconstitutionality of CICA
The first step in assessing CICA is to note that operational power is at
issue. The ability to make procurement decisions is an essential prerequisite for agency independence in policy implementation. By permitting the
Comptroller General to manipulate stay duration, CICA allows direct interference with the procurement decisions of executive bureaucrats. This
gives Congress the ability to frustrate virtually any agency initiative. 98
89. S. REP. No. 50, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-9 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 2174, 2179-82.
90. See 10 U.S.C. § 2305 (1988); 41 U.S.C. § 253(a) (1982).
91. 31 U.S.C. § 3552 (Supp. V 1987).
92. [d. §§ 3553(b)-3553(c).
93. HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, THE PRESIDENT'S SUSPENSION OF THE COMPETITION IN CONTRAcrlNG Acr IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, H.R. REP. No. 138, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5
(1985).
94. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 100-463, § 8139, 1988 U.S. CODE
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 2270, 2270-47 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. §3554(a)(I». This
limitation was enacted, according to its sponsor, to remove any "legal cloud over the constitutionality"
of CICA. 134 CONGo REC. Sl1,542 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1988) (statement of Sen. Cohen).
95. 31 U.S.C. § 3553(d)(2) (Supp. V 1987).
96. This assertion relies on two factual premises, neither of which may be empirically supportable. First, it assumes that the Comptroller General is an agent of Congress. But see supra notes 80-82
and accompanying text. Second, it assumes that the Comptroller General's CICA stay powers significantly hamper agency procurement initiatives. But these powers are quite limited. See supra text
accompanying notes 94-95. Perhaps the potential interference with agency functions is de minimis,
and thus inoffensive. Note, however, that in even a moderately fluid market environment the ability to
stay contract execution enables the Comptroller General to prevent agencies from taking advantage of
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Like Chadha's legislative veto, CICA destroys the consolidation of power
by subjecting procurement policy to the joint control of Congress and the
executive agencies. 97
The consolidation principle does not eliminate a congressional role in
oversight of the agencies. It does, however, forbid Congress from unilateral oversight. Congress is certainly able to direct the Comptroller General to investigate procurement decisions and to make recommendations.
But in order to effect these recommendations, Congress must gain the assent of the President. CICA overstepped this limitation by giving the
Comptroller General a tool-the stay provisions-with which to force executive assent. Divesting the Comptroller General of the authority to vary
stay duration would deprive him of this tool and restore the proper balance between consolidation and separation.
C.

The Lear Siegler Opinion

The Lear Siegler court fails to make this analysis, and the reasons for
its error are instructive. The opinion acknowledges that CICA's stay provisions affect procurement, but nonetheless declines to invalidate the law.
Lear Siegler interprets Bowsher's "ultimate authority" language to permit
Congress to influence administrative agencies as long as it stops short of a
total arrogation of power. 98 Because the Comptroller General's eventual
recommendations lack legal force, the court argues that CICA leaves final
procurement decisions to executive agencies and that the scope of the
Comptroller General's power does not violate the "ultimate authority"
standard.
Lear Siegler correctly perceives that a notion of ultimate authority is at
the heart of the Bowsher holding. But the court misunderstands the phrase
by appreciating only one of its two meanings. First-as Lear Siegler does
understand-"ultimate authority" expresses the standard of review employed by the Court in Bowsher: Legislation is unconstitutional if it excludes the President entirely. But-and this is what Lear Siegler
misses-this standard is not applicable to every case. Where operational
power is at stake, restraints on congressional intermeddling are much
stricter; under the consolidation principle, any interference is offensive,
even if the President is not completely shut out.
That is the second meaning of "ultimate authority": It describes the
sort of policy-making power that implicates the principle of separation
favorable market conditions. This gives the Comptroller General powerful bargaining leverage with
which to force agency compliance with congressional procurement objectives.
97. For alternative appraisals of CICA's constitutionality, see Burns & Markman, supra note 34,
at 593-98; Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV.
1253,1289-93 (1988); Weitzel, GAO Bid Protest Procedures Under the Competition in Contracting
Act: Constitutional Implications After Buckley and Chadha, 34 CATH. D.L. REV. 485 (1985).
98. Lear Siegler, 842 F.2d at 1108 ("critical issue is whether Congress or its agent seeks to
control (not merely to 'affect') the execution of its enactments") (emphasis in original).
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rather than consolidation. Bowsher properly applied the "ultimate authority" standard of review because the case involved the ultimate power of
budgeting. In contrast, the Comptroller General exercises operational
power under CICA. By failing to recognize this distinction, the Lear Siegler court mistakes the type of power at issue in CICA, and it applies a
correspondingly mistaken standard of review. Put another way, the appropriate precedent is Chadha, not Bowsher, because CICA, like the legislative veto, allows Congress to interfere directly with the decisions of government bureaucrats (see Figure 2).99 The Ninth Circuit's failure to
distinguish between the two Supreme Court decisions is not surprising in
light of the Court's own confused rhetoric. Lear Siegler stands as a challenge to the Court to set out clearly the conceptual framework underlying
its separation of powers holdings.
Figure 2
Principle Employed
by Court

Case

Type of Power
at Stake

Chadha, CICA

operational -

correct

Bowsher
Lear Siegler

ultimate

correct

v.

-

operational -

incorrect

----

consolidation
separation
separation

CONCLUSION: NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE PRINCIPLE
OF CONSOLIDATION

Thus far I have endeavored to make two central points. My first claim
is that the Court's abandonment of the nondelegation doctrine signalled
the New Deal's repudiation of a Federalist conception of separation of
powers. Second, I claim that to fill the doctrinal void left by the demise of
the non delegation doctrine, and to give effect to the vision of activist government affirmed by the New Deal, the Court has developed a two-tiered
theory demanding both that administrative agencies be sufficiently power99. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988), is also interesting in this connection. Morrison
upheld the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95521,92 Stat. 1867 (independent counsel provisions codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (Supp. V 1987».
This Act established a procedure for appointing a special prosecutor to investigate and litigate charges
of misconduct by executive branch officials. Some analysts interpreted the special prosecutor as a
congressional aggrandizement of power that is properly the executive's. Morrison, however, correctly
applies the two-tiered theory in vindicating the Act. The critical fact ignored by the Act's detractors is
that the prosecution of official misconduct is an exercise of ultimate, not operational power; the special
prosecutor's actions are directed at government officials, not private citizens. Rather than leave such
prosecution decisions entirely within the hands of Justice Department officials, the separation principle calls for dispersion of authority among all three branches. The Act accomplishes this with a
finely-wrought scheme conditioning prosecution on action by Congress, the Attorney General, and a
"special division" of a Federal court. Critics of the Morrison decision make the Lear Siegler error in
reverse: Because they mistake Morrison for a case involving operational power, they incorrectly apply
the consolidation principle.
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ful to regulate autonomously and that control over the direction and shape
of the administrative state be divided between Congress and the President.
Even readers who accept these contentions may nonetheless resist a
two-tiered theory on normative grounds. In particular, the consolidation
principle is likely to meet opposition based on a Federalist argument that
consolidated power spells tyranny: Power must be divided so that the government will be "oblige[d] ... to control itself."loO
But this view is no longer valid; it hinges on an untenable distinction
between government action and government inaction. Those who consider
the Constitution to guarantee positive rights-the right to freedom from
discrimination for example, or the right to educationlol-will certainly
agree that rights can no longer be thought to rest on government inaction
(or, at the very least, that rights are no more likely to be vindicated by
government inaction than by activism).102
Even tho~e who reject a broad reading of constitutional rights must
recognize the enduring lesson of the New Deal period that the "natural"
system of common law market regulation is not prepolitical. l03 This recognition renders anachronistic a theory of political rights preferencing
government inaction. The two-tiered theory builds on the insight that government action should not be conceptualized as change from some private,
prepolitical baseline. Rather, government action should be treated as part
of the background.
Because administrative agencies do not change drastically on their
own,104 however, the political theory I am suggesting is not as dissimilar
to the Federalist theory as it may appear. It calls for a revisim of the
separation of powers, not a rejection of it. In the Federalist view, separated powers enable each branch to veto government action it thinks unconstitutional. The view of the two-tiered theory is somewhat different:
Each branch can veto a change in the status quo that it deems unconstitutional. The slow rate of internally-driven agency change gives meaning
to the separation principle's check on the exercise of ultimate power. The
Federalist bias against action is transformed into a bias against change.
100. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 U. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
lOt. See, e.g., Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 7-19 (1969) (Constitution guarantees
"minimum welfare"); Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH.
U.L.Q. 659; if. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986)
(suggesting that some constitutional rights might be characterized as positive).
102. Professor Mashaw adds justifications for activist agencies based on wealth maximization and
on governmental legitimacy. See Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why A.dministrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1 J.L. EcON. & ORGANIZATION 81, 91-99 (1985).
103. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("[Wjhether the law of the State
shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of
federal concern.").
104. Political science literature is rife with claims that the pace of bureaucratic change is incremental. See, e.g., H. KAUFMAN, ARE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS IMMORTAL? (1976); S. KELMAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY 109-10 (1987).

